Social Cognition: Evolutionary History of Emotional Engagements with Infants
A new mother and baby gaze into each other's eyes, mutually engaging with facial expressions, kisses and greetings. A new study shows that this behaviour is not uniquely human: such intersubjective interactions may have an evolutionary history of at least 30 million years.
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In the 1970s, developmental psychologists discovered that human newborns imitate [1] and that 2-3 month-olds engage in 'protoconversations' with mutual gaze and positive emotion [2] , which has been dubbed 'primary intersubjectivity' [3] . The psychologists reasonably concluded that these inborn competencies set human infants on a species-typical developmental path of communication (language) and intelligence, which we describe, in more recent terminology, as social cognition evident in joint attention or theory of mind [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . New evidence for primary intersubjectivity in rhesus macaques, reported by Ferrari et al. [9] in this issue of Current Biology, confirms the evolutionary continuity of primate communication and sets its point of origin to at least 30 million years ago.
We study communication in nonhuman primates and in pre-linguistic humans, in part, to understand the evolutionary and developmental foundations of human communication [4, 5] . Research on mother-infant communication suggests that primary intersubjectivity is one of the key foundations of human communication, and has identified four behavioural markers: neonatal imitation; mutual gaze; behaviours that can assume communicative meaning; and flexibility in communicative meanings [2, 3] . The comparative study reported by Ferrari et al. [9] provides exciting new evidence about primary intersubjectivity which suggests it has a very long evolutionary history, challenging earlier conclusions. Communicative engagements with infants, particularly emotionally-based intersubjective engagements, appear to be a characteristic shared by humans, great apes and, surprisingly, rhesus macaques.
Developmental research in the last 40 years has documented remarkable communicative competencies in human infants based in emotional engagements [2, 3] . For example, there are 'proto-conversations' between adults and very young infants, evident in the dynamic structure of initiations by one partner and joining in by the other (turn-taking), in the mutuality of engagement marked by greetings (reciprocity of vocal turns), and climaxing with reciprocal exchanges of positive emotion (rewarding the achievement of peak engagement). Human infants, as early as the first month of life, take an active role in such communication. These face-to-face emotionally positive engagements are a context in which social partners co-construct communicative meaning. Humans have an additional suite of imitation skills found in the neonatal period, including imitating facial movements, facial expressions, some sounds, and some manual actions [6] , supporting the conclusions of developmental psychologists that humans have inborn communicative motivations [3] .
Evolutionary considerations address the issue of whether primary intersubjectivity is uniquely human, and if not, how old it is, in evolutionary time (operationally defined as a function of which extant species have it) [10] . The presence of intersubjectivity in extant great apes and Old World monkeys, but not in New World monkeys, implies that intersubjectivity likely emerged in primate ancestors dated from 30 million years ago. The presence of intersubjectivity only in humans, however, would imply a much more recent evolution (within the last 6 million years). There may be continuity in the entire process of primary intersubjectivity, or it may be that only some of the components are shared across primates.
One of the most exciting findings reported by Ferrari et al. [9] is that rhesus monkey mothers and their newborns engage in mutual gaze. Direct eye gaze in rhesus macaques is well known as a threat display. But rhesus mothers, and other social partners, exhibit mutual gaze with young infants. This gaze is accompanied by lipsmacking, an audio-visual signal of affiliation, and kissing, a tactile signal of affiliation, documenting that mutual gaze with infants is not aggressive. Some rhesus mothers actively seek their infant's gaze, and hold the infant's head to encourage mutual gaze. This is highly reminiscent of the chin tilts given by some chimpanzee mothers that accompanies their significantly heightened levels of mutual gaze [11] . These behaviours confirm the mother's investment in achieving mutuality in gaze. In building the case for primary intersubjectivity in rhesus macaques, the foundational component of mutual gaze, within a positive emotional context, is convincingly present.
Added to the foundation of mutual gaze are the emotionally positive, affiliative behaviors of lipsmacking and kissing. Lipsmacking is particularly interesting because it adds an element of responsiveness to the exchange of auditory signals, perhaps with each partner taking a turn in the 'proto-conversation'. Indeed, Ferrari et al. [9] report that some rhesus infants initiate lipsmacking, illuminating the infants' active role in establishing engagement with the mother. Some rhesus newborns lipsmack in imitation of their mothers. Just as human mothers exaggerate their facial expressions and vocalizations when interacting with young babies ('motherese'), rhesus mothers exaggerate their lipsmacking with newborns, increasing both the visual and auditory components -evidence for a rhesus macaque type of 'motherese'. Motherese is important to developmental psychologists as this particular infant-directed behavior may assist in the learning of communicative signals [2] . Thus, primary intersubjectivity in rhesus macaques includes mutual gaze, positive emotional engagements and reciprocal exchange of socially meaningful sounds. Some psychologists will not accept naturally occurring events as proof of imitation, and so the claims that rhesus have neonatal imitation by Ferrari et al. [9] would be interpreted by them as inconclusive. But, in earlier work, Ferrari and colleagues [12, 13] have conducted the necessary controlled experiments to provide compelling evidence of neonatal imitation in rhesus macaques.
The first report of neonatal imitation in humans was in 1977 [1] . For many years, newborn imitation appeared restricted to humans. The first report of neonatal imitation in chimpanzees was in 1998 [7, 14] , with recent suggestions that neonatal imitation might have a communicative function in chimpanzees, as it does in humans [15] . The discovery of the mirror neuron system in the motor cortex of rhesus macaques in the mid 1990s brought new excitement to the study of imitation (for example [4, 6, 7] ), but it was another 10 years until neonatal imitation was reported in rhesus macaques [12] . With newly extended experimental findings that rhesus macaque newborns imitate lipsmacking and tongue protrusions [13] , and the new naturalistic observations of imitative lipsmacking [9] , there is now convincing evidence of neonatal imitation in a monkey species.
An important component of primary intersubjectivity is its facilitation of communication. In order to enter into a flexible communicative system, infants must first have behaviours that can assume communicative meaning. Communicatively meaningful behaviours can develop, even from simple behaviour such as eye gaze. Human newborns can manage face-to-face interactions, for example by signalling availability with attentive gaze, and signalling over-stimulation with gaze aversion [2] . Chimpanzees give positive vocal greetings and smiles to familiar faces and voices [7] . In their new study, Ferrari et al. [9] found that newborn rhesus monkeys initiated and responded to lipsmacking, selectively prioritizing engagements with their mothers. In other words, newborn rhesus monkeys manage face-to-face interactions, by giving positive greetings to emotionally significant social partners. Humans, chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys have behaviours that can, and do, assume communicative meaning.
A remaining question is the extent to which the primary intersubjective system of the rhesus monkey has flexibility. Rigidity in communicative behaviours suggests that social partners have limited influence in communicative outcomes. An excellent example of flexibility is the finding that rhesus newborns imitate tongue protrusions [12, 13] . Tongue protrusions are not part of the speciestypical displays of rhesus macaques. Thus, with the encouragement of a positive emotional engagement setting with mutual gaze and with lipsmacking -as a result of a primary intersubjective system -newborn rhesus macaques imitate novel facial expressions. Similarly, chimpanzee newborns imitate tongue clicks, which are not species-typical [15] . The addition of this component of flexibility in behavioural outcomes completes the ensemble, and provides compelling evidence that indeed all the components of primary intersubjectivity are present in rhesus macaques.
In making these broad group comparisons, similarities in primary intersubjectivity have been highlighted. It should be asked, however, why so little evidence of intersubjectivity in nonhuman primates has been reported. A major factor must be that no-one was looking for it. It is only relatively recently that developmental psychologists described emotional engagements of this sort in human infants [2] . Comparative scientists have only recently focused on emotions and engagements [16] , and still rarely focus on positive emotions in development (for exceptions, see [17] [18] [19] Further research is required to address the issues of frequency and contexts. Perhaps only some components will be found in some primates. For example, during neurobehavioral testing with capuchin infants (a New World monkey), a brief bout of responsive calling with turn-taking occurred, but there was no mutual gaze [20] . The length of the developmental period in which the primary intersubjectivity system is functioning, however, may differ across species. Rhesus macaques clearly do have a period of primary intersubjectivity [9] , which appears to last for a few weeks after birth; chimpanzees have a period of primary intersubjectivity, which appears to last several months after birth; humans have a period of primary intersubjectivity, which lasts through the first half year of life. The developmental period when primary intersubjectivity is active appears to differ dramatically across primates, and perhaps relates to differences in the complexity and/or flexibility of communication.
Primary intersubjectivity may function similarly across primates, allowing for emotional engagements in support of early communicative interactions. Psychologists were surprised by the discoveries of primary intersubjectivity in human infants. Even developmental psychologists, however, were surprised by the discoveries of primary intersubjectivity in chimpanzees. Now it is comparative psychologists and biologists who are challenged to become engaged with this important discovery of primary intersubjectivity in rhesus macaques [9] . These findings support the conclusion that primary intersubjectivity evolved more than 30 million years ago in a common ancestor of Old World monkeys, apes, and humans.
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The first century of post-Pasteur microbiology saw rapid movement to investigate the properties and capabilities of microorganisms, elucidating their roles in fermentation, nitrogen fixation, photosynthesis, decomposition and pathogenesis. The strength of these studies stemmed from isolated cultivation of candidate organisms so that their contributions could be assessed independent of interactions with, or interference from, surrounding cells. Indeed, one of Koch's postulates requires that an infecting bacterium should be able to initiate the course of the disease it is attributed to causing.
Yet not all biological processes can be explained through the actions of organisms acting alone. Over the past few decades, microbiologists have embraced a view of microbes within the context of their communities, where they act as members of multicellular consortia capable of actions and impacts unachievable by individuals. Density-dependent signaling is often observed in single species communities, such as the coordinated production of light by Vibrio within host squids [1] . Signaling between Myxobacteria cells allows them to act as coordinated swarms in the digestion of shared food sources and creation of fruiting bodies [2] . Developmental cooperation has been extended to bacteria traditionally regarded as soloists, such as natural isolates of Bacillus subtilus acting to create complex fruiting bodies [3] . Both intraspecific and interspecific cooperation is seen among biofilm and microbial mat partners -for example, during interspecies hydrogen transfer -and interspecies communication may spur the production of alarmones such as Autoinducer 2 [4] .
Nogueira et al. [5] , reporting in this issue of Current Biology, have pushed this idea even further, examining the cooperative use of proteins using Escherichia coli as a model system. Bacteria produce a wide range of
